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GUDHUN S. 'l'HOMPSON, as Administratrix, etc., Appellant, v. SHERMAN LACEY, as Administrator, etc.,
Respondent.
[1] Automobiles-Care as to Guests.-Ko person who as a guest
accepts a ride in a vehicle without giving compensation has a
right of action for damages against driver unless he establishes that damages were caused by intoxication or wilful misconduct of driver. (Veh. Code, § 403.)
[2] !d.-Care as to Guests-Passenger and Guest Distinguished.The designations "passenger" and "guest" have been adopted
for purpose of distinguishing a person who has given compensation within meaning of Veh. Code, § 403, from one
carried gratuitously.
[3] Id.-Care as to Guests-Who are Passengers.-Where several
employees of a company in course of their employment are
riding in an automobile of one of employeeR for purpose of
attending a meeting called by company in connection with its
business, and employee owning car receives mileage for its
use in employer's business from employer who knows he is
engaged in practice of transporting other employees on employer's business, owner of car receives a tangible benefit
from employer, though it may be small, and employer receives
an economic benefit because it would pay less traveling expenses to its employees attending meeting by reason of arrangement whereby only one employee would. receive mileage,
since employer in effect is paying one employee to bring the
others to meeting.
[4] Id.-Care as to Guests-Who are Passengers.-Compensation
for transportation in a vehicle need not be paid by the one
transported in order to make it transportation for compensation under Veh. Code, § 403; it may be paid by someone other
than rider.
[5] Id.-Care as to Guests-Who are Passengers.-Where it may
be inferred that act of one employee of company in driving
other employees to company meeting in his automobile was
for mutual economic benefit of all concerned, the company as
well as employees, an employee who was killed during such
transportation as result of collision with another vehicle was
a passenger rather than a guest.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, § 333 et seq.; Am.Jur., Automobiles, § 237 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 123(1); [2-6] Automobiles, § 123(2).
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[6] Id.-Care as to Guests-Who are Passengers.---Where driver
of automobile receives a tangible benefit, monetary or otherwise, which is a motivating influence for furnishing transportation, the rider is a passenger and driver is lin ble for orc1inary negligence.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. C. M. Monroe, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for wrongful death arising out of an
automobile accident. Judgment of nonsuit reversed.
Luce, Forward, Kunzel & Scripps and Edgar A. Luce, Jr.,
for Appellant.
Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, Ward W. Waddell, Jr., and
Alfred S. Wilkins for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-A judgment of nonsuit, the subject of this
appeal, was entered in plaintiff's action for the death of her
husband, Virgil T. 'l'hompson, allegedly caused by the negligence or wilful misconduct of Donald Kerns in operating a
car in which Thompson was riding. The administrator of
the Kerns' estate is defendant, plaintiff having dismissed
the action as to defendants Kelley-Moyer 'rransportation
Company and Charles Fogle.
The sole issu<:Js are whether Thompson was a guest or passenger in the car being driven by Kerns when Thompson,
riding therein, met his death, and, if the former, whether
Kerns was guilty of wilful misconduct thus being liable
although Thompson was a guest.
[1] No person who as a guest accepts a ride in a vehicle
without giving compensation has a right of action for damages against the driver unless he establishes that the damages
were caused by the intoxication or wilful misconduct of the
driver. (Veh. Code, § 403.) [2] "The designations 'passenger'
and 'guest' have been adopted for the purpose of distinguishing a person who has given compensation within the meaning of section 403 of the V chicle Code from one carried
gratuitonsly. '' (Whitmore v. French, 37 Cal.2d 744, 746
[235 P.2d 3] .) No question concerning Kerns' negligence is
presented.
At the time of the accident Kerns was driving his car with
Thompson riding in the front seat with him and Mr. Dreis
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in the back seat. In endeavoring to pass a car ahead of him
in foggy weather, Kerns' car collided head on with an oncoming truck. Kerns, Thompson and Dreis were employees of
Arrowhead and Puritas "\Vater Company and were en route
from San Diego to Los Angeles.·~ Kerns was manager for
the company in the San Diego area. Under his supervision
were Dreis and Thompson, each of whom was a sales supervisor for a portion of that area; their duty was to supervise
the selling and delivt'ry activities of salesmen selling and
delivering bottled water, the company's product. Before the
day of the accident, Kerns, Thompson and Dreis received
notice from the company requesting that they attend a company meeting in Los Angeles of all the branch managers
and sales supervisors. The meeting was one of a series of
regular monthly meetings inaugurated in 1950 (prior to that
time the meetings had been irregular) and it was necessary
that all three attend because the matter to be considered was
important to them and to the company in their work and
its business. ·while there was no ''set'' policy for transportation of the employees to the meetings, that is, they
could come by private car or public transportation, as they
chose, the company knew Thompson and Dreis had ridden
with Kerns in the latter's car to attend several meetings and
did not object. The company reimbursed the employees for
expenses incurred in coming to the meetings, including an
allowance of 7 cents a mile for the first 500 miles when a
private car was nsed. The employee driving his car to the
·meeting would get the mileage, and those riding with him
would not, which was ''more economic'' for the company
as expressed by Swanburg, the company's manager of all
branches, and is plainly inferable from the evidence.
[3] We have a situation then in which several employees
of a company, in the course of their employment, are riding
in tbe car of one of the employees for the purpose of attending a meeting called by the company in connection with its
business. The employee owning the car receives mileage for
its use in the employer's business from the employer. Al*The company is not a party to the action and it may be noted that
an employee injured in the course of his employment by the negligence
of his employer's agent may recover damages from the agent in a civil
action, as the agent is considered a third person or a person other than
the employer under the workmen's compensation laws. (Wallace v. Pacific Electdc Ry. Co., 105 Oal.App. 664 [288 P. 834]; see Baugh v. Rogers,
24 Oa1.2d 200 [148 P.2d 633, 152 A.L.R. 1043]; Lab. Code, § 3852 et seq.)
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though it may be small, clearly the owner of the car receives
a tangible benefit from the employer. While he would have
received the same amount whether or not he carried other
employees with him, the fact remains that he did receive it
under conditions in which he \Yas transporting other employees
on the employer's business and his employer knew he engaged
in that practice. It may be inferred that Thompson and
Dreis went to the meeting with Kerns because they considered a suggestion by him that they do so as a command
inasmuch as he was their supervisor. The company thereby
received an economic brnefit because it would pay less traveling expenses to its employees attending the meeting by
reason of the arrangement whereby only one employee (Kerns,
the owner of the car) would receive mileage, since the employer, in effect, was paying the one employee to bring the
others to the meeting. This means that the one driving the
car would receive a benefit for supplying transportation to
a fellow employee, not from the fellow employee but from
his employer. [4] \lYe know of no authority, however,
which holds that compensation for the transportation must
be paid by the one transported in order to make it transportation for compensation under section 403 of the Vehicle
Code. The compensation may be paid by someone other than
the rider. (Malloy v. Fang, 37 Cal.2d 356 [232 P.2d 241] ;
Whitechat v. Guyette, 19 Cal.2d 428 [122 P.2d 47] .)
[5] Even if Kerns had not received mileage there is a
sound basis for holding Thompson to be his passenger rather
than a guest. It vms for the mutual economic benefit of all,
Thompson, Kerns, Dreis, and the company, that the three
go to the meeting because of the relationship between them
and the nature and purpose of the meetings and the regular
occurrence thereof. In 2WaUoy v. Fong, supra, 37 Cal.2d 356,
defendant Fong was transporting a child to a defendant
church playground, performing the duties of defendant Antisdale, the pastor of the church, when plaintiff was injured
as a result of Fong's negligence. \Ve there said (p. 376):
"It is immaterial that Fong performed the services gratuitously; he performed those services as the agent of the
Presbytery in discharging Antisdale's duty to transport the
children to the playground for their recreation period. It is
snfficient therefore if Antisdale, the church, or the Presbytery
received a benefit from the transportation of plaintiff to the
playground.

1
1
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''The transportation of plaintiff to the playground for the
recreation period was not an isolated transaction; it was an
integral part of the conduct of the Bible school as one of
the normal activities of the San Mateo Presbyterian Church.
It is undisputed that the attendance of the children at the
Bible school was at least of mutual benefit to the children
and the church. The conduct of such schools was authorized
by the church laws, and it was to the interest of the church
and the Presbytery that parents send their children to the
school. A.ntisdale had a large number of handbills printed
urging attendance at the school. The children had recently
been released from secular schools for their summer vacation,
and many parents wanted their children to spend the time
in the open air. It is not an unreasonable inference that
the daily open-air recreation periods were designed to induce
these parents to send their children to the school and did
induce them to do so. Such an inference negatives the theory
that no compensation was given for the transportation to
such recreation periods. '[B]enefits or considerations other
than cash or its equivalent may be ''compensation.'' . . . ' ''
Similarly here it may be inferred that Kerns was acting for
the company in transporting Thompson and Dreis to the
meeting and that the transportation was for the mutual
economic benefit of all concerned. (See Whitechat v. Guyette, supra, 19 Cal.2d 428.)
[6] It may reasonably be inferred that while the benefits
received by Kerns, the driver, may not have been the sole
motivating influence, they were motivating influences of a
substantial character. "Where, . . . the driver receives a
tangible benefit, monetary or otherwise, which is a motivating
influence for furnishing the transportation, the rider is a
passenger and the driver is liable for ordinary negligence.
(See Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal.2d 237 [143 P.2d 704]; Druzanich v. Oriley, 19 Cal.2d 439 [122 P.2d 53] ; Whitechat v.
Guyette, 19 Cal.2d 428 [122 P.2d 47]; Walker v. A.darnson,
9 Cal.2d 287 (70 P.2d 914] ; Kertstetter v. Elfrnan, 327 Pa.
17 [192 A.. 663, 664-666].)" (WhitrnMe v. French, supra,
37 Cal.2d 744, 746; see, also, Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal.2d
237 [143 P.2d 704]; II-urnphreys v. San Francisco Area
Council, Boy Scouts, 22 Cal.2d 436 [139 P.2d 941].)
The instant case has factors not present in Druzanich v.
Oriley, supra, 19 Cal.2d 439, which support plaintiff's position here.
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Inasmuch as we have concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to show that Thompson was a passenger it is not
necessary to consider plaintiff's contention that the evidencr
is sufficient to show wilful misconduct on the part of Krrns.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.

[L. A. No. 22902.
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AURELIA ARMEN'fA et al., Appellants, v. DALE
CHURCHILL et al., Respondents.
[1] Highways-Construction-Work of Construction or Repair.Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, art. 2, § 1506, declaring that "Construction Safety Orders" included in such title are applicable
to "the excavation, construction, alteration, repairing, renovating, removal or wrecking of buildings or otl1er structures,"
applies to the repair and resurfacing of a highway.
[2] Automobiles-Backing: Signals and Warnings.-Construction
Safety Order 1753(b) of Cal. Admin. Code, declaring that
trucks used to haul construction material shall be equipped
with a horn, bell or whistle and that "the warning will be
sounded while the truck is backing up," was issued by Division
of Industrial Safety in conformity with provisions of Lab.
Code, §§ 6312, 6500, as a measure for protection and safety of
workmen who cannot be expected to keep constantly on lookout for backing trucks.
[3] Constitutional Law-Equal Protection of Laws-Classification.
-The Constitution does not prohibit legislative classification;
the mere production of inequality which necessarily results to
some degree in every selection of persons for regulation does
not place classification within constitutional prohibition.
[4] Automobiles-Backing: Signals and Warnings.-Construction
Safety Order 1753(b) of Cal. Admin. Code, declaring that
trucks used to haul construction material should be equipped
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 272 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Consti.tutional Law, § 476 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Highways, § 72; [2, 4-8] Automobiles, §§ 91, 103; [3] Constitutional Law, § 149; [9] Statutes,
§ 194; [10] Evidence, § 33; [11] Automobiles, §§ 202, 318, 325;
[12] Automobiles, § 318; [13-15] Automobiles, § 202; [16] Evidence, § 307.

